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Abstract
This paper researches the characteristic of time sensitive protocols and presents a method with simple
operations to verify protocols with time stamps and avoid false attacks. Firstly, an extension of π calculus
is given to model a time sensitive security protocol. And then, by appending linear arithmetic constraints
to the Horn logic model, the extended Horn logic model of security protocols and the modiﬁed-version
veriﬁcation method with time constraints are represented. All operations and the strategy of veriﬁcation
are deﬁned for our constraints system. Thirdly, a method is given to determine whether the constraints
has a solution or not. Finally, as a result of an experiment, Denning-Sacco protocol with time stamps is
veriﬁed. The experiment shows that our approach is an innovative and eﬀective method on verifying time
sensitive security protocols.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades, more and more protocols are used for tasks such as key
distributions, identity authentications, e-commerce transactions etc. However, se-
curity protocols do not always achieve their objectives because of the interleaving
run of its inﬁnite sessions and the attacker’s deliberate demolishment. To avoid the
replay and delay, freshness, counters and time stamps are used to mark the freshness
of messages in protocols [6]. Most sophisticate protocols are designed to ﬁx these
problems by the use of time stamps which are numbers marking a speciﬁc instance
of time. The use of time stamps can be described as follows: the sender issues a fresh
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message with the time stamp that marks its time of issue; then, the receiver checks
whether the time stamp has not expired to establish the validity of the message.
For example, Needham-Schroeder protocol with conventional keys [21], which is the
best known of all security protocols, is described as Table 1. The main problem
① A→S: A,B,NA
② S→A: {NA, B,Kab,
{Kab,A}Kbs}Kas
③ A→B: {Kab,A}Kbs
④ B→A: {NB}Kab
⑤ A→B: {NB − 1}Kab
Table 1
The formal description of
Needham-Schroeder protocol
(3) I(A)→ B:{Kab′, A}Kbs
(4) B→ I(A):{NB}Kab
′
(5) I(A)→ B:{NB − 1}Kab
′
Table 2
The formal description of freshness
attack of NS protocol
① A→S: A,B
② S→A: {B,Kab, TA, {Kab,
TA, A}Kbs}Kas
③ A→B: {Kab, TA, A}Kbs
④ B→A: {NB}Kab
⑤ A→B: {NB − 1}Kab
Table 3
The formal description of
Denning-Sacco protocol
with this protocol is that B has no way of ensuring that the message ③ is fresh. An
intruder can compromise the session key and then replay the appropriate message
③ to B and then complete the protocol like Table 2. This attack is available because
the session key is generated randomly by server and is only used in a session, so
it’s not sophisticate. If it expires, the intruder will hold it. Denning and Sacco
suggested ﬁxing the freshness ﬂaw in Needham-Schroeder protocol(NS for short)
above by the use of time stamps in [10]. Table 3 is Denning-Sacco protocol(DS for
short) which is the improvement version of Needham-Schroeder protocol.
However, there will be lots of false attacks found by most current methods,
because they often treat time stamps as freshness or neglect them. By removing
the complexity of time, they will have veriﬁed the original protocol if they can verify
the simpliﬁed protocol. They have to check each attack by themselves to make sure
the protocol is insecurity. For example, if DS is veriﬁed by them, there is a false
attack like table 2. In our model, the attack in NS doesn’t exist in DS, because
the constraints in the sequence of the attack are unsatisﬁable in DS. Therefore, our
method could avoid false attacks when we verify time sensitive security protocols.
Bruno Blanchet and Martin Abadi have proposed a security protocol model
based on Horn logic in [1,3,4]. This model is derived from the linear logic model
by abstract interpretation, program transformation and Skolemizing formulae with
existential quantiﬁers. Based on this model, they also present an eﬃcient method
which ﬁts for verifying interleaving runs of the security protocol’s inﬁnite sessions
and terminates for many security protocols. The linear logic model is a state-
transition system model of security protocols, and the Horn logic model is an ab-
stract model. [16] proposes an extended Horn logic model for security protocols,
and gives the modiﬁed-version veriﬁcation method to construct counter-examples
automatically[25]. The counter-examples are represented in standard notation,
which is more elegant and intelligible than the representation form based on traces.
Based on these theories, [17] develops an eﬃcient veriﬁer SPVT(Security Protocol
Verifying Tool). Some classic protocols are veriﬁed correctly by SPVT, such as a
series of Needham-Schroeder authentication protocols(security and authentication),
Yahalom protocol(authentication), and so on.
For the relation between times is the powerful one to determine whether mes-
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sages are valid or not, we must research the order of these time stamps. We need
use constraints of time variables and clocks to build this relation. In fact, time
sensitive security protocols can be naturally speciﬁed by constraints programming.
Symbolic operation will also be the best way to verify time sensitive security proto-
cols. On basis of [1,3,4,16,17,25] and the linear arithmetic constraints, we propose a
constraints-based method for modeling, analyzing and verifying time sensitive pro-
tocols as follows: we investigate the characteristics of time stamps, and then, add
time factors to the process calculus model and Horn logic model, and present in
which conditions time constraints could be solved; since time constraints are made
up with linear equations and inequations, we can also work out whether time con-
straints are satisﬁable by using the algorithm for constraints resolution in linear
programming. In the result, we strengthen the veriﬁcation capability of the Horn
logic model, and keep its eﬀectiveness on veriﬁcation. This method can verify secu-
rity protocols with or without time stamps and report a readable counterexample
when there is an attack. This paper will discuss the model and veriﬁcation of time
sensitive protocols. The constraints system is discussed in detail in [18].
There have been some other researches on time sensitive security protocols such
as [2,5,7,9,12,13,14,15,19,20,24]. [2] veriﬁes some time-dependent protocols by in-
ductive approach. Though it uses this method to verify Kerberos IV, the application
of this method is limited due to the simpliﬁed time model. It is very important to
make the time model more naturally. [5] presents a symbolic decision procedure for
time-sensitive cryptographic protocols with time stamps. It uses logic formulae to
describe symbolic constraints. However, it doesn’t associate time values to short
term keys, that is, it can’t verify DS protocol. [9] used MSR to verify security
protocols with time stamps. Its veriﬁcation uses simple logic reductions, and the
symbolic exploration method can be used to verify time-dependent secrecy and au-
thentication properties, but it needs to compute symbolic reachability graph. [12]
performs a semi-automated analysis of a CSP model (with event-based time) of
WMF. The description of time in CSP looks like time in real world, but it needs
PVS to ﬁnd an invariants property, and it can’t give an answer when computing
does not terminate. In [19], the user speciﬁes the protocol using a more abstract
notation, and Casper compiles this into CSP code, suitable for checking using FDR.
The user has to deﬁne a ﬁnite integer set as the range of time stamps, so time stamps
are discrete, and Casper can just check a ﬁnite number of sessions. [14] simpliﬁes
time sensitive protocols into ones without time stamps. It won’t lose attacks, but
it will ﬁnd false attacks for simpliﬁcation versions. In our method, the range of
time stamps is in a continuous interval of real number without no the upper bound,
and this method can verify protocols with an unbounded number of sessions. Last
but not least, constraints assure there is few of false attacks generated by time
stamps. [24] has described a temporal logic to reason about authentication proto-
cols and has treated several examples in earlier 1990s. Diﬀerent people may use
this logic to present the same property or protocol in diﬀerent ways, and automatic
reasoning in temporal logic is very diﬃcult, so it’s very hard to verify time sensitive
protocols automatically in this model. There are many other papers on timeout
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and retransmission. R.Corin concerns how to model and verify contiguous time by
time automata, and studies attacks in timeout and retransmission in [7]. Gorri-
eri studies a real-time process algebra presented for the analysis of time-dependent
properties, and focuses on composite results in [13]. Jeremy Y.Lee describes an al-
gebra for modeling the real-time aspect of systems in a mobile environment, which
is the extended algebra by introducing a timeout operator in [15]. [20] studies a
compositional denotational model for Timed CSP, and it focuses on timeout and re-
transmission, but not in the characteristic of time stamps. However, those methods
all cannot construct counter-examples automatically.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the process calculus
used to describe security protocols formally and naturally. In Section 3, we discuss
the extended model on Horn logic with time constraints, translation of a protocol
from the process calculus to the Horn logic, and veriﬁcation on the Horn logic with
time constraints. In Section 4, we discuss the characteristic of constraints in our
model and give a method to determine if there is a solution for the constraints. In
Section 5, we analyze Denning-Sacco protocol in detail. Section 6 concludes the
future work.
2 Protocol Modeling in the Process Calculus
Security protocols are distributed parallel programs. They can be described as the
parallel composition of multiple role-processes using π-like calculus. We propose a
π-like calculus for modeling security protocol, which is Applied-π[23] calculus added
with some time events and is described in Table 4.
M,N ::= Terms
x, y, z variable
a, b, c, k Name
f(M1, · · · ,Mn) Constructor
P,Q::= Processes
c¯ < M > .P Output
c(x).P Input
0 Nil
P |Q Parallel
!P Replication
(νa)P Restriction
let x = g(M1, · · · ,Mn) in P Destruction
if M = N then P Condition
begin(M,M ′).P Begin event
end(M,M ′).P End event
Check(t).P Check event
Mark(t).P Mark event
Set d = int in P Set event
F ly(d).P Fly event
Table 4
The syntax of the process calculus
processA
Set d = d1 in c(xB).begin(Bparam, xB).c¯ <
(host(Kas), xB) > .c(X). let {XB, XKab,
XT1, XTicket} = decrypt(X, Kas) in if xB=XB
then Check(XT1).c¯ < XTicket > .c(Y ). let
XNB = decrypt(Y,XKab) in F ly(d1 + d2).c¯ <
{XNB − 1}XKab >.0
processS
c(XAB).if XAB = (x, y) then if x = host(Kxs)
then if y = host(Kys) then Mark(T1).c¯ <
{y,Kab(T1), T1, {Kab(T1), T1, x}Kys}Kxs >.0
processB
Set d = d1 + d2 in c(XTicket). let {XKab,
XT1, xA} = decrypt(XTicket,Kbs) in Check(
XT1). (νNB)c¯ < {NB(XT1)}XKab >. c(xBack).
let xN = decrypt(xBack,Kbs) in if xN=
NB(XT1)−1 then F ly(d1+d2).end(Bparam, B).0
DS
(νKas)(νKbs)c¯ < host(Kas) > .c¯ < host(Kbs) > .
((!processA)|(!processS)|(!processB))
Table 5
The Description Model of DS protocol
Our π-like calculus is similar to the calculus in [4], and also has two parts:
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terms(data) and processes(programs). The identiﬁers x, y, z, and similar ones range
over variables, and a, b, c, k range over names. f is a constructor which is used to
build terms. The processes are deﬁned similarly to [4], but we add to it four time
events: Check, Mark, Set, Fly. These events are used to deal with time stamps.
Check event is used to check whether the time stamp is valid or not. The parameter
d represents the lifetime of a message, which is the most allowable network delay.
This event appears when the process receives a message with time stamps and need
to check its freshness. Mark event is used to mark t as the current clock now when
the sender wants to issue a fresh message with the time of issue, that is, t equals
to the current value of now. Set event is used to assign a value of lifetime to d.
Fly event is used to declare time rolling by, that is, the current clock now passes
a period d. Using our π-like calculus, Denning-Sacco protocol can be described as
the process DS in Table 5.
The identiﬁer A is short for host(Kas) in this paper, and decrypt(X,K) returns
plain text which is encrypted to X by a key K. Notes that NB(XT1)− 1 is a term,
but d1+d2 is an algebraic expression. [4] deﬁned secrecy and authenticity in process
calculus, and specify the theory. We use this calculus to model the description of
protocols, but we use Horn logic to verify them, so the following paper will discuss
the veriﬁcation of Horn logic with constraints in detail.
3 Modeling protocol with time constraints in Horn logic
3.1 Syntax
This paper is interested in veriﬁcation of security protocols with time stamps, and
discusses how to verify time sensitive security protocols in the model with con-
straints on Horn logic. So we are interested in how to consolidate the protocol
model on Horn logic with time constraints so as to model and verify time sensi-
tive security protocols. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will not introduce the
veriﬁcation on Horn logic in [1,3,4].
We ﬁrst introduce special terms to represent time variables, and time functions.
The syntax of the Horn logic model with time constraints is described in Table 6.
The Horn logic uses these predicates: attacker, begin, and end. The fact
attacker(M) means that the attacker may have M , begin(M,N) that the event
begin has been executed with a parameter corresponding to M and environment
N , and end(M,N) that end has been executed in session list N with a parameter
corresponding to M . If the constraint is true in a rule, then the rule will ignore this
constraint, that is, H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn → F means H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn → F : true. For conve-
nience, we deﬁne a global clock now which is a special place-holder and represents
current time. The sender overprints time stamps refer to now. When the receiver
receives this message, he will check time stamps with the current time. If time
stamps have not expired, he will believe the message is still valid. The parameters
representing network delays can be assigned in the beginning. For convenience, let
{M1,M2, · · · ,Mn} be a combination of terms M1,M2, · · · ,Mn.
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Term M,N,Mes::=
time variable t1, t2, · · · ,
time function tf(t1 , · · · tn) where t1, · · · , tn are time variables or
time functions; if n = 0, then tf is a time constant.
variable x, y, z
name a[M1, · · · ,Mn],i,j
function f(M1, · · · ,Mn)
Atom, Fact F,C::=
attacker predicate attacker(M)
begin predicate begin(M,N)
end predicate end(M,N)
Constraint C::=
f(x1, · · · , xn)#g(y1, · · · , ym)|C1, C2, where f and g
are n-ary and m-ary functions which return linear
combination of these variables, # ∈ {<,=,≤}.
Rule R,R′::=
logic rule F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn → F : C where C is constraint.
Table 6
The syntax of the model with constraints on Horn logic
3.2 Translation to Horn logic
The model of roles in security protocols is a group of logic rules. In logic rules,
encrypted data is represented as term encrypt(x,y) abbreviated to {x}y , where y
is a term like Kas denoted a key shared between a and s, and x is a term. d is a
parameter representing network delay. If we want to do anything with some rule,
we must be sure that its constraints can be satisﬁable.
Rules for the attacker The intruder’s Dolev-Yao model [11] is very popular in anal-
ysis and veriﬁcation of security protocols. In this model, the intruder can control
the network wholly, so he can intercept, retransmit, and fake messages transmitted
over open network. He can read any message and block further transmission, de-
compose a message into parts and remember them, generate fresh data as needed,
and compose a new message from known data and send. Besides the classic rules of
Dolev-Yao model in [1,3,4], we also add the next rule for time sensitive protocols:
→ attacker(k(t)) : now > Δ + t
This new rule means that the lifetime of the session key k is Δ(Δ is a big time
constant and k(t) means that k is generated at the time clock t), and session keys
can only be leaked by accident when they have expired.
Rules for the protocol The honest roles are described by the process calculus in
Section 2. The translation P ρhC of a process P is a set of rules, where the
environment ρ is a sequence of mappings x → p and a → p from (time) vari-
ables and names to patterns, h is a sequence of facts of the form attacker(M) and
begin(M,M ′), and C is a list of constraints. The empty list is denoted by ∅, with
the concatenation of a constraint aCons to the list C is denoted by C ∪ {aCons}.
exp1 < exp2 < exp3 is short for two constraints: exp1 < exp2 and exp2 < exp3.
The concatenation of a mapping x → M to ρ is denoted by ρ[x → M ], where x is a
name or a variable. Based on the abstracting rules in [4], we give abstracting rules
for our process calculus as follows:
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(1) 0ρhC = ∅;
(2) P|QρhC = PρhC ∪ QρhC;
(3) !PρhC = Pρ[i → i]hC, where i is a new variable(session identiﬁer)
(4) ν(a)P ρhC = Pρ[a → a[ρ(V0), ρ(Vs)]]hC, where V0 is the tuple made up with
input variables, Vs is the set of session identiﬁers, and a becomes a new function
symbol;
(5) c(x).PρhC = Pρ[x → x](h ∧ attacker(x))C;
(6) c¯ < M > .PρhC = PρhC ∪ {h → attacker(ρ(M)) : (ρ(C))});
(7) let x = g(M1, · · · ,Mn) in P else QρhC =
⋃
{P(σρ)[x → σ′p′](σh)(σC)|g(p1 ,
· · · , pn) → p
′, where, the pair (σ, σ′) is a most general uniﬁer one, such that
σρ(M1) = σ
′(p1), · · · , σρ(Mn) = σ
′(pn)} ∪ QρhC;
(8) Begin(M).PρhC = Pρ(h ∧ begin(ρ|(Vo∪Vs), ρ(M)))C;
(9) End(M).PρhC = PρhC ∪ {h → end(ρ(Vs), ρ(M)) : (ρ(C))};
(10) Check(t).PρhC = Pρh(C[now → old now] ∪ {now − d < t < now}), where
old now is a new time variable;
(11) Mark(t).PρhC = Pρh(C ∪ {t = now});
(12) Set d = int in PρhC = P(ρ[d → int])hC;
(13) Fly(d).PρhC = Pρh{now − exp1 − d#exp2 | ∀lineq ∈ C, and lineq =
now− exp1#exp2, where # ∈ {<,≤}, exp1, exp2 are algebraic expressions.}.
The translation of a process is a set of Horn clauses with constraints that enable us
to prove that it sends certain messages or executes certain events in the constraints.
The list C keeps conditions, and when they are satisﬁable, the rule may ﬁre. The
translation of those events without modifying constraints is the same as [4]. So we
will present the last four events in this paper.
The translation of a Check adds two constraints, such that the process will
believe the time stamp t is new when t is in a time interval (now − d, now). At
that point, now in C is the time referring the clock of a pre-action before this
action Check(t), so it should be replaced by a new time variable old now. P can be
executed after the message has been checked and these constraints are satisﬁable.
The translation of a Mark adds a constraint, meaning that the process fetches the
current time as its time stamp. The translation of a Set adds a mapping d → int
to the environment ρ. This event is used to assign the lifetime of messages, so the
receiver will believe the message is new when the receiving time minus the lifetime is
less than or equal to the time stamp. The translation of a Fly modiﬁes constraints
to loosen the lower bound made by now.
3.3 Veriﬁcation
Suppose R = H → F : C, let GetRule be GetRule(R) = H → F , let GetCons be
GetCons(R) = C, and let σ be a uniﬁer. σ′ is the maximal sub-constraint of σ
involving only time terms. If L is a constraint or a set of constraints, σ|L is the
T. Zhou et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 212 (2008) 103–118 109
maximal sub-constraint of σ involving only the variables in L.
By introducing time constraints into Horn logic model, this method can veriﬁed
time sensitive security protocols. The factor of time leads to rebuild processes of
veriﬁcation of security properties. Conﬁdentiality requires that session keys should
not be leaked by exchanging messages when they have not expired. For the sake
of simplicity, we focus our attention on the veriﬁcation of authentication. Our
strategies are described as follows:
(1) Verifying a protocol without constraints in the Horn logic model;
(2)If there is a counter-example, we will verify the sequence of the counter-example
in the extended model with time constraints. If the counter-example holds on in
the extended model, then there is an attack in this protocol, else the attack is the
falsehood.
[1,3,4] have given a complete work to verify protocol without constraints in the
Horn logic model. So this paper will focus on how to deal with (2) in our strategies.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Resolution] Let R1 = H11 ∧H12 ∧ · · · ∧H1n → F : L1 and R2 =
H21 ∧ H22 ∧ · · · ∧ H2m → C : L2 be two logic rules, F = attacker(Mes),H2i =
attacker(Mes′), or F = end(M,Mes),H2i = end(M,Mes
′), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, such that
Mes can be uniﬁed with Mes′, and θ = mgu(Mes,Mes′) is the most general uniﬁer
of Mes and Mes′. Let L = (L1∪L2)θ
′∪{t1θ
′ ≤ t2θ
′|t1 = max{t|t ∈ dom(θ
′|L1)},and
t2 = max{t|t ∈ dom(θ
′|L2)}}, and if L is satisﬁable, then the resolution R1 • R2
between R1 and R2 is (H21 ∧ · · · ∧ H2(i−1) ∧ (H11 ∧ · · · ∧ H1n) ∧ H2(i+1) ∧ · · · ∧
H2m)θ → C2θ : L , we say F
′ = selectedAtom(R2) is the selected atom of R2, and
θ = sub(R1, R2) is called the substitution of the resolution R1 •R2.
We assume that R1 and R2 don’t have any other variables in common(this is
simply a matter of renaming variables). R1 provides the head, that is, it sends a
message. R2 provides a fact in the body, which means it receives a message. So
the latest time in R1 is earlier than that in R2. Therefore, we should add a new
constraint to the ﬁnal constraints to represent this relation.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Rule Implication] Let R1 = H11 ∧ · · · ∧ H1m → C1 : L1, and
R2 = H21 ∧ · · · ∧H2n → C2 : L2 be two logic rules, if C1 = attacker(Mes1), C2 =
attacker(Mes2), or C1 = end(M,Mes1), C2 = end(M,Mes2), deﬁne rule implica-
tion R1 ⇒ R2, if and only if : there exists a substitution σ , such that Mes1σ =
Mes2, and for each H1i = attacker(M
′
i), there exists H2j = attacker(M
′′
j ), and
for each H1i = begin(M,M
′
i ), there exists H2j = begin(M,M
′′
j ), such that M
′
iσ =
M ′′j (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n), and L2 |= σ
′ ∧ L1. The substitution σ is called the
implication substitution of R1 ⇒ R2.
Rule implication determines whether there is an instantial relation between two
rules, that is, R2 is an instantiation of R1.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Derivability] Let B be a set of logic rules, let F be a closed atom,
F is derivable from B if and only if there exists a ﬁnite tree deﬁned as follows:
(1) There is one constraint C in this tree
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(2) Its nodes(except the root node) are labeled by rules R ∈ B, and its edges are
labeled by closed atoms.
(3) If the tree contains a node labeled by R with an incoming edge labeled by F0 and
n outgoing edges labeled by F1, · · · , Fn, then R ⇒ F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn → F0 : C.
(4) The root node has only one outgoing edge labeled by F.
such a tree is called a derivation tree of F from B. If the edges of the derivation tree
are labeled by atoms instead of the closed atoms, then we say F is weak-derivable
from B, and the tree is called a weak-derivation tree of F from B.
The function GetMes is deﬁned as follows: ifH = attacker(M), then GetMes(H)
=< “attacker”,M >; if H = begin(M ′,M), then GetMes(H) =< “begin”,M >;
if H = end(M ′,M), then GetMes(H) =< “end”,M >.
Suppose R(= H → C : L), if H = ∅, then there is a partition E = {Ci|i =
1, · · · ,m}(1 ≤ m ≤ n) on H = {H1, · · · ,Hn} such that: (1)if Hi,Hj ∈ Ck,
GetMes(Hi) = GetMes(Hj); (2)if i = j, Ci ∩ Cj = ∅; (3)∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ m), Ci = ∅;
(4)
⋃
E = H.
LetH′ = {Hj|j = min{k|Hk ∈ Ci}, i = 1, · · · ,m}, then the function elimdup(R)
is deﬁned as follows: if H = ∅, then elimdup(R) = H′ → C : L; otherwise,
elimdup(R) = R. If the function elimdup is applied on H , the result is H′.
Deﬁnition 3.4 [The Sequence Of Derivation] Let P be the security protocol model
on Horn logic, and R0 be a closed rule, R1, · · · , Rn ∈ fixpoint(P ), if there exists
R1, · · · , Rn such that: Ri+1 = elimdup(Ri+1 •R
i), 0 ≤ i < n, we say R0, · · · , Rn is
a sequence of derivation from R0 on R1, · · · , Rn, shorthand of a ﬁnite sequence of
derivation in ﬁxpoint(P).
Deﬁnition 3.5 [Goal] Atoms in the form attacker(x)(x is an arbitrary variable)
and begin(M,M ′) are called false goals. Atoms in the form attacker(M ′)(M ′ is not
a variable) and end(M,M ′) are called goals.
Deﬁnition 3.6 [Solved Form] Let H → L : C be a logic rule, if the atoms in H are
all false goals, then we say H → L : C is in solved form.
Let SolvedForm denote the set of the logic rules that are in solved form, and
UnSolvedForm denote the set of the logic rules that are not in solved form.
Deﬁnition 3.7 [X-resolution] Let R1 = H11 ∧ H12 ∧ · · · ∧ H1n → F : L1 and
R2 = H21 ∧ H22 ∧ · · · ∧ H2m → C : L2 be two logic rules, R1 ∈ SolvedForm,
R2 ∈ UnSolvedForm, and F = attacker(Mes), let F
′ = attacker(Mes′) be a
goal H2i in the body of R2, such that Mes can be uniﬁed with Mes
′, and θ =
mgu(Mes,Mes′) is the most general uniﬁer of Mes and Mes′. Let L = (L1 ∪
L2)θ
′ ∪ {t1θ
′ ≤ t2θ
′|t1 = max{t|t ∈ dom(θ
′|L1)},and t2 = max{t|t ∈ dom(θ
′|L2)}},
and if L is satisﬁable, then X-Resolution R1 ◦R2 between R1 and R2 is (H21 ∧ · · · ∧
H2(i−1) ∧ (H11∧ · · · ∧H1n)∧H2(i+1) ∧ · · · ∧H2m)θ → Cθ : L,F
′ = selectedGoal(R2)
is called the selected goal of R2, θ = sub(R1, R2) is called the substitution of the
X-Resolution R1 ◦R2.
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LetR0 = R2◦R3, R1 = elimdup(R0), R2 ∈UnSolvedForm, R3 ∈SolvedForm,
θ = sub(R2, R3), for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, Ri = Hi1 ∧ · · · ∧Hif(i) → Ci : Li, where f(i)
denotes the number of atoms in the body of Ri,Hij = attacker(Uij) or Hij =
begin(Mij , Uij)(1 ≤ j ≤ f(i)), for each U1j(1 ≤ j ≤ f(1)), deﬁne representative-
Atom(U1j) and deletedAtom(U1j) as follows:
representativeAtom(U1j ) = H0s, where s = min{k|U0kθ = U1j , k = 1, · · · , f(0)};
deletedAtom(U1j ) = {H0k|U0kθ = U1j}− representativeAtom(U1j ).
Let R1 = H1 → F1 : L1 and R2 = H2 → F2 : L2 be two logic rules. In the
deﬁnition of resolution, each atom such as attacker(M ′) and end(M,M ′) in the
body of R2 can be selected as a selected atom; in the deﬁnition of X-resolution,
false goals will not be selected. Let R be a logic rule, and B be a set of logic rules.
We can deﬁne addRule(R,B) as follows:
If ∃R′ ∈ B,R′ ⇒ R, then addRule(R,B)=B;
else addRule(R,B)={R} ∪ {R′|R′ ∈ B,R R′} ∪ {marked(R′′)|R′′ ∈ B,R ⇒ R′′}.
Let {R1, · · · , Rn} be a set of logic rules, deﬁne
addRule({R1, · · · , Rn}, B) = addRule({R2, · · · , Rn}, addRule(R1, B)).
Marked(R′′) denotes that R′′ will not be used to compute X-Resolutions. Let
Marked denote the set of logic rules that will not be used to compute X-Resolutions,
and UnMarked denote the set of logic rules that are not in Marked.
Let P be a logic program, deﬁne:
Rule(0)(P ) = {elimdup(R)|R ∈ P}
T (0)(P ) = Rule(0)(P ) ∩ SolvedForm
C(0)(P ) = Rule(0)(P ) ∩UnSolvedForm
X Resolution(0)(P ) = {elimdup(R)|R = R′ ◦R′′, R′ ∈ T (0)(P ), R′′ ∈ C(0)(P )}
Rule(n+1)(P ) = addRule(X Resolution(n)(P ), rule(n)(P ))
T (n+1)(P ) = Rule(n+1)(P ) ∩ SolvedForm
C(n+1)(P ) = Rule(n+1)(P ) ∩UnSolvedForm
X Resolution(n+1)(P ) = {elimdup(R)|R = R′ ◦R′′, R′ ∈ T (n)(P ), R′′ ∈ C(n)(P )}.
Deﬁnition 3.8 [Solved-Form ﬁxpoint] Let P be the model of a security protocol
on Horn logic, deﬁne fixpoint(P ) = {T (n)(P )|n ≥ 0}∩UnMarked, fixpoint(P ) is
called the Solved-Form ﬁxpoint of P.
For the authentication property, deﬁne derivablerec(R,B,P) as:
if ∃R′ ∈ B,R′ ⇒ R, then derivablerec(R,B,P ) = ∅
else if R = begin(M1,M
′
1) ∧ · · · ∧ begin(Mn,M
′
n) → end(M,M
′), then
derivablerec(R,B,P ) = {R}
else derivablerec(R,B,P ) =
⋃
{derivablerec(elimdup(R′ •R),
{R} ∪B,P )|R′ ∈ fixpoint(P )}
And deﬁne derivable(F,P ) = derivablerec(F → F : true, ∅, P ).
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Lemma 3.9 Let P be the model of a security protocol on Horn logic and F be a
closed atom. If F is weak-derivable from P, then F is derivable from P.
Let C and S be two constraints systems, and Q be a set of variables, deﬁne:
find corr exp(C,Q) = {exp|exp ∈ C, and fv(exp)∩Q = ∅} and correspond exp(C,
S) = {exp|exp ∈ C, and fv(exp) ∩ fv(S) = ∅} Obviously, there exists n > 0 such
that unionsq(correspond expC(C))(S) = (correspond expC(C))
n(S), where correspond
expC(C)(S) is the curried function of correspond exp(C,S).
Deﬁnition 3.10 [Derivation sub-tree] Let P be the extended Horn logic model
of a security protocol and F be a closed atom, T is a derivation tree of F whose
constraints tag is C. T ′ is called a derivation sub-tree of T if T ′, whose constraints
tag is unionsq
(
correspond expC(C)
)(
find corr exp(C, fv(T ′))
)
, is obtained by cutting
some edges in T and all branches starting from these edges. If T ′ has n nodes, then
T ′ is called an n-nodes derivation sub-tree of T.
Lemma 3.11 Let P be the model of a security protocol on Horn logic, and F be a
closed atom, where F is derivable from P and T is a derivation tree of F. Let T’ be
a derivation sub-tree of T and C be the constraint of T’,T’ is obtained by cutting
edges e1, · · · , es in T and all branches starting from e1, · · · , es, which are labeled
by closed atoms F1, · · · , Fs respectively, then there exists a logic rule R such that
R ⇒ F1∧· · ·∧Fs → F : C, moreover, there exists a logic rule R
′ and a logic rule set
B such that derivablerec(R′, B, P ) ⊆ derivablerec(F,P ) and ∀R′′ ∈ B,R′′  R′.
The authentication properties are characterized by the correspondence assertions
begin(M,M ′) and end(M,M ′), let Bb = {→ begin(M1,M
′
1), · · · ,→ begin(Mn,M
′
n)},
and for each begin(M,M ′) or end(M,M ′), there exists a time variable tbegin(M,M ′)
or tend(M,M ′).
Deﬁnition 3.12 [Authentication] Let P be the security protocol’s model on Horn
logic, begin(M,M ′) and end(M,M ′) be the correspondence assertions, and end(M ,
M ′) be a closed atom, if end(M,M ′) is derivable from P∪Bb, then→ begin(M,M
′) ∈
Bb, and tend(M,M ′) − tbegin(M,M ′) < Δ(Δ is the allowable delay in the protocol),
we say the security protocol satisﬁes the authentication property with respect to
begin(M,M ′) and end(M,M ′).
Theorem 3.13 Let P be the model of a security protocol on Horn logic, and let
F be a closed atom as end(M,M ′), if F is derivable from fixpoint(P ) ∪ Bb, then
begin(M,M ′) ∈ Bb, if and only if, if F is derivable from P∪Bb, then begin(M,M
′) ∈
Bb.
The proofs of those lemmas and theorem are similar as those in [3], and we just
modify the proofs trivially to get proofs of these theorems. Because some deﬁnitions
are added with time constraints, we also require these constraints be satisﬁable as
described by deﬁnitions when we prove them. The strategies of proofs are the same
as those in [3]. These modiﬁcations are very easy, so we will not give out these
proofs.
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Theorem 3.14 Let P be the model of a security protocol on Horn logic, and let
F be a closed atom as end(M,M ′), F is derivable from fixpoint(P ) ∪ Bb, and
begin(M,M ′) ∈ Bb, if and only if, there exists H1∧· · ·∧Hn → F : C ∈ derivable(F ,
P ), where each Hi ∈ Bb(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the atom as begin(Mi,M
′
i), begin(M,M
′) ∈
{H1, · · · ,Hn} and C is solvable.
4 Constraints system
From the analysis of our method, there is no problem in verifying time sensitive se-
curity protocols in Horn logic model. But it is also important to determine whether
the constraints system has a solution or not. Though there are so many methods
to solve linear constraints, such as the method of Simplex and the algorithm of
Fourier-Motzkin [8][22], these methods pay attention to the general linear systems
and are complicated to be implemented. When there are symbolic arguments in
constraints system, it is very diﬃcult to determine the solution by these methods.
Therefore, this section will discuss the satisﬁability of our constraints system.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A TVPI system is a system of linear inequalities where each in-
equality involves at most two variables. A TVPI system is called monotone if each
inequality is of the form axi−bxj ≤ c, where both a and b are positive. If a = b = 1,
we call this system is a uni-TVPI system.
In our system, inequalities can be generated by the following case:
• Check event: this event will check if the time stamp t is valid, so now− d < t <
now will be added to constraints system C. This event introduces inequalities
that are of the form x− y < c which can be loosed into the form of x− y ≤ c.
• Mark event: this event only generate equality t = now.
• Set,Fly events: they only modify time constants, and don’t add or minus in-
equalities in our system.
• The process of resolution and X-resolution will introduce a new inequality t1θ
′ ≤
t2θ
′ to the merge of two uni-TVPI systems, so the ﬁnal system is a uni-TVPI one.
Therefore, our constraints system is a uni-TVPI system. we can use the Fourier-
Motzkin elimination method to ﬁnd a feasible solution to a uni-TVPI system. How-
ever, the main drawback of this method is that the number of inequalities may grow
exponentially. In a uni-TVPI system, we can make a stronger statement:
Theorem 4.2 A uni-TVPI system S has no solution if and only if there is a se-
quence t1 ≥ t2 + d1, t2 ≥ t3 + d2, · · · , tn ≥ t1 + dn, and
n∑
i=1
di > 0.
To determine whether or not a uni-TVPI system has solution, our strategy is as
follows:
Suppose ti has a greatest lower bound ti+1+di(i = 1, · · · , n), and tn+1 = t1. Using
resolution, one obtains a sequence of inequalities t1 ≥ ti+1 +
i∑
j=1
dj(i = 1, · · · , n).
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The last one will yield 0 ≥
n∑
i=1
di. If
n∑
i=1
di is actually greater than 0, there is a
contradiction, that is, the system can’t be satisﬁed.
Theorem 4.3 A uni-TVPI system S has no solution if and only if there is a cycle
t1
d1−→ t2
d2−→ · · ·
dn−1
−−−→ tn
dn−→ t1 in the corresponding graph G, and
n∑
i=1
di > 0.
This problem can be translated into one in the graph, and it is very easy to im-
plement the algorithm for the solution of the constraints system. We present a
polynomial algorithm to ﬁnd a cycle t1
d1−→ t2
d2−→ · · ·
dn−1
−−−→ tn
dn−→ t1 in the corre-
sponding graph G, and
n∑
i=1
di > 0 in [18].
5 Detailed Analysis of Protocol
In this section, we will show how to verify time sensitive security protocols in our
method. For convenience, we use < instead of ≤ in our model. Based on the trans-
lation in Section 3.2, the logic program of Denning-Sacco protocol can be derived
as follows:
A:① → attacker(A) : true
② → attacker(B) : true
③ begin(· · · ) ∧ attacker({B,XKab,XT1,XT icket}Kas) → attacker(XTicket) :
now − d1 < XT1 < now
④ begin(· · · ) ∧ attacker({B,XKab,XT1,XT icket}Kas) ∧ attacker({NB(t)
}XKab) → attacker({NB(t)− 1}XKab) : now− d1− (d1 + d2) < XT1 < now
S:⑤ attacker(x) ∧ attacker(y) → attacker({y,Kab(T1), T1, {Kab(T1), T1, x}Kys
}Kxs : T1 = now
B:⑥ attacker({XKab,XT1, xA}Kbs) → attacker({NB(XT1)}XKab) : now− d1−
d2 < XT1 < now
⑦ attacker({XKab,XT1, xA}Kbs)∧attacker({NB(XT1)−1}XKab) → end(· · · )
: now − 2(d1 + d2) < XT1 < now
I:⑧ → attacker(Kab(t)) : now > D + t
where D is the lifetime of session key Kab and is a very big constant, we can suppose
D is bigger than all of time constraints. So we will resolve as follows:
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①②⑤:(1) → attacker({B,Kab(T1), T1, {Kab(T1), T1, A}Kbs}Kas) : T1 = now
③(1):(2) begin(· · · ) → attacker({Kab(t1), t1, A}Kbs) : now − d1 < t1 < now
⑥(2):(3) begin(· · · ) → attacker({NB(t1)}Kab(t1)) : now − d1 − d2 < t1 < now,
t2− d1 < t1 < t2 < now
(4) attacker(Key) ∧ attacker({X}Key) → attacker(X) : true
⑧(4):(5) attacker({X}Kab(t)) → attacker(X) : now > D + t
(3)(5):(6) begin(· · · ) → attacker(NB(t1)) : now > D + t1, t3 − d1 − d2 < t1 < t3,
t2− d1 < t1 < t2 < t3 < now
(7) attacker(x) → attacker(f(x)) : true, where f : x → x− 1
(6)(7):(8) begin(· · · ) → attacker(f(NB(t1))) : t4 > D + t1, t3 − d1 − d2 < t1 < t3,
t2− d1 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t4
(9) attacker(x) ∧ attacker(K) → attacker({x}K) : true
⑧(9):(10) attacker(x) → attacker({x}Kab(t)) : t5 > D + t
(8)(10):(11) begin(· · · ) → attacker({f(NB(t1))}Kab(t)) : t4 > D+ t1, t3− d1− d2 <
t1 < t3, t2 − d1 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t4, t5 > D + t, t5 > t4
⑦(2):(12) begin(· · · )∧ attacker({NB(t1)− 1}Kab(t1)) → end(· · · ) : t2− d1 < t1 <
t2, now − 2(d1 + d2) < t1 < now
(11)(12):(13) begin(· · · ) → end(· · · ) : t2′ − d1 < t1 < t2′, now − 2(d1 + d2) < t1 <
now, t4 > D+ t1, t3−d1−d2 < t1 < t3, t2−d1 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t4, t5 >
D + t1, t5 > t4
By Section 4, we have t1 > now−2(d1+d2) > t5−2(d1+d2) > D+t1−2(d1+d2) =
t1+(D−2(d1−d2)), that is, 2(d1+d2) > D. If this symbolic condition is satisﬁed,
there is no contradiction. In fact, the lifetime of a message is far smaller than the
lifetime of the session key, so there is 2(d1+d2) < D. It means that the constraints
system of (13) has no solution. The resolution couldn’t continue, so the freshness
attack in Needham-Schroeder protocol do not appear in Denning-Sacco protocol.
The meaning of above steps is that the rule (2) means A sends a new ticket which
B receives. When B believes this ticket is a new one, he gives a freshness nonce
encrypted by the session key. The rule ⑦ limits time stamp XT1(which is t1 later)
in a special interval, that is now − 2(d1 + d2) < t1 < now in the (13). When we
gain the rule (12), the constraints assume the current clock is greater than D + t1.
The constraints of the last rule require the distance between t1 and the current
time is less than 2(d1 + d2), and also the current time is greater than D + t1, but
D ≥ 2(d1 + d2), so these constraints will not be satisﬁed.
6 Conclusions
The veriﬁcation on Horn logic is very eﬀective, and it can verify the interleaving run
of security protocol’s inﬁnite sessions. But this model cannot verify time sensitive
security protocols, because there is no time information in them. This paper takes
as examples the linear arithmetic constraints in [9], and add time constraints to the
Horn model. [9] veriﬁes protocols in backward exploration, so it deﬁnes a special
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term sup which is not easy to deal with in uniﬁcation. The resolution of Horn
logic is faster than those of other logics. The complexity in the Horn logic model
with time constraints just increases in the deciding the satisﬁability of constraints.
With time constraints, we provide a uniform framework for the speciﬁcation of an
arbitrary number of protocol sessions with fresh name generation and time stamps.
Denning-Sacco protocol is veriﬁed in this paper. The result illustrates that, ﬁrstly,
our model with time constraints reserves the eﬃciency of the Horn logic model, and
secondly, that it extends the capability of analysis and veriﬁcation. In this method,
we can ﬁnd the condition in which there is no attack in the protocol. People found
some protocols’ ﬂaws which may not satisfy time constraints, that is, these ﬂaws are
false attacks. Therefore, analyzing and verifying time sensitive security protocols is
an eﬀective way to avoid false attacks. Our approach is an innovative and eﬀective
method on verifying time sensitive security protocols.
Our future work is : (1) to implement this method in our verifying tool SPVT
to verify time sensitive security protocols and to give a condition in which there is
a solution; (2) to use the improved SPVT to automatically verify sophisticate time
sensitive protocols such as Kerberos V.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Prof. Xiaoyu Song for useful discussions about the structure
of this paper and useful modiﬁcations for its presentation. We would also like to
thank the anonymous referees, whose useful comments have greatly improved the
quality of this paper.
References
[1] Abadi, M. and B. Blanchet, Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs, in:
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, 2002, pp. 33–44.
URL citeseer.ist.psu.edu/abadi02analyzing.html
[2] Bella, G., “Inductive Veriﬁcation of Cryptographic Protocols,” Ph.d. thesis, University of Cambridge,
London (2000).
URL citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/bella00inductive.html
[3] Blanchet, B., An eﬃcient cryptographic protocol veriﬁer based on prolog rules, in: 14th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), 2001, pp. 82–96.
[4] Blanchet, B., From secrecy to authenticity in security protocols, in: M. Hermenegildo and G. Puebla,
editors, 9th International Static Analysis Symposium (SAS’02), Lecture Notes in Computer Science
2477 (2002), pp. 342–359.
[5] Bozga, L., C. Ene and Y. Lakhnech, A symbolic decision procedure for cryptographic protocols with
time stamps (extended abstract)., in: CONCUR, 2004, pp. 177–192.
[6] Clark, J. A. and J. L. Jacob, A survey of authentication protocol literature, Technical Report 1.0 (1997).
URL citeseer.ist.psu.edu/clark97survey.html
[7] Corin, R., S. Etalle, P. H. Hartel and A. Mader, Timed model checking of security protocols, in: FMSE
’04: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering (2004), pp.
23–32.
[8] Cormen, T. H., C. E. Leiserson, R. L. Rivest and C. Stein, “Introduction to Algorithms,” MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001, second edition.
T. Zhou et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 212 (2008) 103–118 117
[9] Delzanno, G. and P. Ganty, Automatic Veriﬁcation of Time Sensitive Cryptographic Protocols, in: Proc.
of Int. Conf. on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS’04), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 2988 (2004), pp. 342–356.
[10] Denning D, S. G., Timestamps in key distribution protocols, Communications of the ACM 24 (1981),
pp. 533–536.
[11] Dolev, D. and A. C. Yao, On the security of public key protocols, Technical report, Stanford, CA, USA
(1981).
[12] Evans, N. and S. Schneider, Analysing time dependent security properties in CSP using PVS, in:
ESORICS, 2000, pp. 222–237.
[13] Gorrieri, R., E. Locatelli and F. Martinelli, A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol
analysis., in: ESOP, 2003, pp. 114–128.
[14] Hui, M. L. and G. Lowe, Fault-perserving simplifying transformations for security protocols, Journal
of Computer Security 9 (2001), pp. 3–46.
[15] Lee, J. Y. and J. Zic, On modeling real-time mobile processes, in: ACSC ’02: Proceedings of the twenty-
ﬁfth Australasian conference on Computer science (2002), pp. 139–147.
[16] Li, M., Z. Li and H. Chen, Security protocol’s extended horn logic model and its veriﬁcation method,
Chinese Journal of Computers 29 (2006), pp. 1667–1678.
[17] Li, M., Z. Li and H. Chen, Spvt: An eﬃcient veriﬁcation tool for security protocol, Chinese Journal of
Software 17 (2006), pp. 898–906.
[18] Li, Z., T. Zhou, M. Li and H. Chen, Constraints solution for time sensitive security protocols, in: FAW
2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4613 (2007), pp. 190–202.
[19] Lowe, G., Casper: A compiler for the analysis of security protocols, in: 10th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop (CSFW-10) (1997), pp. 18–30.
[20] Lowe, G. and J. Ouaknine, On timed models and full abstraction., Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci.
155 (2006), pp. 497–519.
[21] Needham R, S. M., Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers,
Communications of the ACM 21 (1978), pp. 993–999.
[22] Schrijver, A., “Theory of Linear and Integer Programming,” John Wiley and Sons, 1986.
[23] Sewell, P., Applied π – a brief tutorial, Technical Report UCAM-CL-TR-498, Computer Laboratory,
University of Cambridge (2000), 65pp.
URL http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/TechReports/UCAM-CL-TR-498.html
[24] Syverson, P. F., Adding time to a logic of authentication, in: CCS ’93: Proceedings of the 1st ACM
conference on Computer and communications security (1993), pp. 97–101.
[25] Zhou, T., M. Li, Z. Li and H. Chen, Automatically constructing counter-examples of security protocols
based on the extended Horn logic model, Chinese Journal of Computer Research and Development 44
(2007), pp. 1518–1531.
T. Zhou et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 212 (2008) 103–118118
